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Abstract  
CEO incentive contracts are commonplace in China but their incidence varies 
significantly across Chinese cities. We show that city and provincial policy experiments 
help explain this variance. We examine the role of two policy experiments: the use of 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and the 
privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs). The introduction of SEZs is found to be 
uncorrelated with the prevalence of CEO incentive contracts. However, firms are more 
likely to use such contracts in areas that saw rapid SOE privatisation, irrespective of the 
firm's own current ownership status and irrespective of the size of the SOE sector in the 
late 1970s. The positive effect of privatisation is robust to various estimation techniques 
and model specifications. These findings suggest that domestic privatisation policies have 
been more influential than FDI in driving the expansion of incentive contracts in China.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A well-functioning market for corporate executives first emerged in China in the 1980s, 
prompted by state experimentation with an array of managerial incentives to accompany 
the gradual withdrawal of the state from its ownership of corporate enterprises (Xu, 
2011). According to Groves et al. (1995: 874) the state introduced reforms "directed at 
improving the efficiency of enterprises by replacing direct control from above with 
managerial incentives". This entailed the gradual commercialisation of state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and their part privatisation, with key innovations including multi-year 
managerial contracts and experimentation with the auctioning of managerial contracts. 
By the late 1980s, this market for corporate executives seemed quite well-established but 
early evidence on its development was confined to executives in the SOEs sector. Recent 
studies are dominated by analyses of the relatively new and rapidly growing public listed 
sector. Although important economically (Bryson et al., 2014), the public listed sector 
accounts for a relatively small proportion of all firms and all CEOs, so the picture it 
paints of executive compensation is necessarily partial. Furthermore, both literatures on 
SOEs and public listed firms have largely ignored one crucial feature of China's efforts to 
foster a market-oriented economy, namely the fact that most initiatives were undertaken 
at local level, often by city authorities in a series of local experiments (Xu, 2011: 1124-
1125).   
 
We fill this gap in the existing literature by exploring the importance of city-level 
influences on firms' use of incentive contracts for CEOs in the early part of the 21st 
Century. We focus on two local "marketisation" programmes: privatisation of SOEs by 
municipal governments and efforts to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) via Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs). If SOEs were early adopters of CEO incentive contracts in 
China, as the earlier literature indicates, one might anticipate higher incentive contract 
adoption in cities with a tradition of high state-ownership of corporations. However, if 
incentive contracts were maintained following privatisation it is possible that those cities 
with early privatisation programmes may have experienced a transfer of incentive 
contracts from the state to the private sector, something which may have encouraged 
other private sector firms to adopt incentive contracts for the first time. Turning to the 
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potential impact of SEZs, Nothing is currently known about their effect on the use of 
incentive contracts by CEOs. However, we do know that SEZs were very successful in 
attracting FDI (Wang, 2013), such that by 2005 China was the third largest recipient of 
FDI funds in the world.
2
 As incentive contracts are a common feature of CEO contracts 
in most Western countries, one might therefore expect the introduction of SEZs to have 
had a further positive influence on the adoption of incentive contracts for executives, by 
aiding the transfer of this 'technology' into China.  
 
Our empirical analysis uses the World Bank's Enterprise Survey 2005 which sampled 
12,400 enterprises in 120 Chinese cities two decades after the initial market-inspired 
reforms. We find incentive contracts are commonplace but that their incidence varies 
significantly across Chinese cities. We find the use of CEO incentive contracts in 2005 is 
positively correlated with the speed with which cities privatised their SOEs, irrespective 
of the degree of current state ownership in the firm. This finding is consistent with the 
conjecture that cities which experimented early on with privatisation created an 
environment in which local firms were encouraged to adopt these new forms of 
managerial practice. The finding is robust to controlling for a wide range of CEO and 
firm characteristics at both individual firm and city level. In contrast, we find that the 
probability that a firm adopts an incentive contract for its CEO is uncorrelated with the 
introduction of SEZs. . 
 
These findings suggest that the network of firms through which CEO incentive contracts 
diffused consisted largely of domestic firms and that high concentrations of foreign 
owned firms did nothing to increase the use of CEO incentive contracts. We suggest that 
this is because foreign-owned firms preferred to use efficiency wages to incentivise 
workers, paying them above the market-rate, rather than via incentive contracts.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section Two we discuss China's 
efforts to create a market-oriented economy and the role of cities in the diffusion of 
                                                 
2
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incentive contracts for executives. In Section Three we present our data and estimation 
approach. In Section Four we present our results and Section Five concludes. 
 
2. THE ADOPTION OF CEO INCENTIVE CONTRACTS AND THE ROLE 
 OF CITY EXPERIMENTATION 
 
In the recent theoretical literature incentive contracts have been treated as a form of 
technology deployed by firms to improve their good management (Bloom and Van 
Reenen, 2011). As such, their adoption is governed by cost and benefit considerations 
similar to those involved in other new technologies (Ichniowski and Shaw, 1995). Their 
diffusion – as with other technologies relating to employment practices which have an 
experiential component – is often dependent upon local networks of firms that share their 
experiences regarding the costs and benefits of innovations (Bryson et al., 2007). Where 
there are performance benefits of the new technology there are first mover advantages to 
early adopters and isomorphic pressures to adopt for followers, such as those described 
by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). If one conceives of CEO incentive contracts in this 
fashion, one might anticipate that the probability of a firm adopting incentive contracts 
for CEOs will partly depend upon the take-up of incentive contracts among other firms in 
the locale. We hypothesise that city location will explain some of the variance in CEO 
incentives in China, independent of the characteristics of firms, the product market in 
which they are operating, their governance structures and the characteristics of their 
executives. 
 
However, there is an additional reason to suppose that there will be a strong geographical 
component to the variance in incentive contract adoption by firms in China. This is the 
local nature of experiments with market mechanisms in China. The transition to a market 
economy in China is unique among Communist and post-Communist regimes. It is 
characterised by what Xu (2011: 1078) describes as "regionally decentralized 
authoritarianism", a regime under which the central state government provides the 
political impetus for change, retains central control of personnel decisions and thus the 
careers of all officials, but cedes responsibility for initiatives and experimentation to sub-
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national governments. We focus on two such initiatives, both of which may be linked to 
the diffusion of CEO incentive contracts.  
 
The first of these initiatives was the reform of SOEs and their part privatisation. Whereas 
in most transition economies SOEs were owned by central government, in China many 
were owned by sub-national governments. The importance of SOEs to regional 
economies meant that local officials' career advancement during the reform period 
depended heavily on improving the productivity and financial performance of SOEs. The 
first wave of SOE reforms in the 1980s involved the introduction of management 
selection by competitive auction, and the introduction of incentive contracts for CEOs 
(Groves et al., 1994, 1995). According to Xu (2011: 1120): "In response to regional 
competition, also under the encouragement of the central government's reform guidelines, 
sub-national governments experimented with various 'managerial responsibility systems' 
in which managers were delegated power to make many decisions, and employees were 
given financial incentives tied to enterprise performance". The reforms achieved their 
goals in improving factor allocation and raising productivity (Jefferson et al., 2006). 
However, burgeoning debt in the SOE sector led to a second wave of SOE reforms in the 
1990s which entailed hardening budget constraints through bankruptcy reforms, reducing 
labour costs through layoffs, and selling loss-making enterprises to private owners (Xu, 
2011: 1121-1126).  
 
As Xu (2011: 1124-1125) notes, privatisation was not encouraged by central government 
until the late 1990s so that "de facto privatisation was tried quietly without official 
permission from central government...Even in the late 1990s, it was still a city 
government's decision whether or not to privatise and how to privatise within their 
jurisdictions". Thus the rate of privatisation was driven largely by municipal 
governments' preferences. We are able to track the rate of privatisation in Chinese 
provinces by measuring the change in the share of employment accounted for by SOEs. 
Over the period 1978 to 2005 the share of urban employment accounted for by SOEs fell 
from a mean of 76 percent to 29 percent (Appendix Table A1). The initial SOE 
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employment shares varied somewhat by province, but the coefficient of variation grew 
over time due to differential rates at which provinces chose to privatise SOEs.
3
 
 
The privatisation process thus became a mechanism by which CEO incentive contracts 
were introduced to the private sector. There were two potential routes. First, around half 
of privatised firms were sold to managers through management buy-outs (Gan et al., 
2010), so that managers previously working under incentive contracts in the state sector 
were now doing so in the private sector. Second, if privatised firms were the first movers 
in adopting incentive contracts, their growth and the seeming importance of these new 
managerial practices to their success may have exerted increasing pressure on existing 
private firms to follow, as predicted under technological diffusion models. 
 
The second reform initiative is the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) introduced to attract 
FDI and develop export-oriented industries. The number of SEZs increased from 4 in 
1980 to 342 in 2005. Their share of total Chinese FDI rose from 35 percent to 94 percent 
and their share of total Chinese exports rose from less than 2 percent to 93 percent (Xu, 
2011: 1114).
4
 Thus, rather than altering the orientation of existing indigenous firms 
towards production and management practices, SEZs were concerned to attract 
newcomers from abroad, and start-ups with substantial foreign backing. 
 
As Wang (2013) and Xu (2011) emphasise, there were several stages in the development 
of SEZs. The first small scale experiments were undertaken between 1979 and 1984 (Xu, 
2011: 1115). Initial successes led to the expansion of the policy in the second half of the 
1980s. In this second stage the central government endorsed SEZs to attract foreign 
investment to coastal cities. By 1992 "SEZs comprised all the capital cities of inland 
provinces and autonomous regions, fifteen free trade zones, thirty-two state-level 
                                                 
3
 Based on the figures in Appendix Table A2 the coefficient of variation across provinces in the 
employment share accounted for by SOEs was 0.10 but this had grown to 0.39 in 2005. The inter-quartile 
range rose from 0.11 to 0.21. The provinces experiencing the most far-reaching privatisation processes 
were Jiangsu followed by Zhejiang and Shandong. Those experiencing the least amount of privatisation 
were Shanxi and Nei Mongol.  
4
 They were originally the brainchild of Xi Zhongxun, governor of Guangdong province, in 1979. 
Following their success Xi became Vice Chairman of the National People's Congress, clearly illustrating 
the link between pioneering local reforms and career success. 
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economic and technological development zones, and fifty-three new- and high-tech 
industrial development zones" (Xu, 2011: 1115). During the 1990s the central 
government sought to expand the experiment by authorizing provincial and city 
governments to set up their own SEZs. In this phase the central government changed its 
role from building SEZs to monitoring the SEZs. In the final stage of SEZ development 
which began at the end of the 20th Century central government approved more national 
level SEZs in the Western Region of China to support the Western Development 
Strategy. 
  
Our data in Appendix Table A2 show that by 2010 118 of the 120 cities in the World 
Bank Enterprise Survey had an SEZ. Of these, 65 attained SEZ status in 1992 or 1993. 
Early SEZ experiments were often trials supported by central government, although 
sometimes after considerable delay (as indicated by the fact that the date for city SEZ 
adoption is often much earlier than the date for national-level acknowledgement).  
 
As Xu (2011: 1114) points out, "a major part of the experiment involved trying new sets 
of institutions, legislation, and rules for the purpose of attracting FDI". The industrial 
organisation literature suggests foreign-based firms are often first-movers in the adoption 
of new technologies as they seek a comparative advantage over local producers that will 
help recoup some of the costs associated with transferring production abroad (Te Velde, 
2003). As noted above, incentive contracts for executives might be seen as one such 
technology, that is, an innovation in personnel management resulting in performance 
gains to the firm that may have been absent without the deployment of incentive 
contracts.  
 
We then anticipate a positive association between incentive contracts and the advent of 
SEZs, since foreign-owned firms are likely to deploy incentive contracts in their firms 
elsewhere in the world (Caves, 1996). If they simply transfer those practices to their 
operations in China, this could result in an influx of firms using incentive contracts for 
CEOs. On the other hand, there can be advantages to firms in adapting their policies to 
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the standard or dominant modus operandi when they make foreign investments.
5
 This 
may occur if firms face disproportionate costs in introducing the practices they use 
elsewhere, or if the host country permits less costly practices than those the firm is 
required to adopt elsewhere. It is also possible that foreign-owned firms will eschew 
incentives contracts if they are able to out-bid domestic rivals for the best executive talent 
by paying above market rates. Indeed there is evidence that foreign owned firms were 
paying higher wages to workers than their domestic counterparts in the early 2000s (Zhou 
et al., 2010). 
 
3. DATA AND ESTIMATION 
 
We investigate the influence of local policy experiments on CEO incentive contracts 
using data from the 2005 World Bank Investment Climate Survey undertaken by the 
National Bureau of Statistics in China (www.enterprisesurveys.org).
 6
 It covers 12,400 
firms located in 120 cities throughout China. One hundred firms were surveyed in each 
city except in the four largest cities (Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing and Chongqing) where 
200 were surveyed. All provincial capitals were sampled together with cities selected 
based on the economic size of the province. Firms were randomly selected within the ten 
largest industries in each province (by value added). Consequently, the survey covers all 
major cities and is broadly representative of industrial economic activity in China as a 
whole.  
 
We link information on privatisation and the introduction of SEZs to the World Bank 
data by matching information from external sources to the city and province identifiers in 
the World Bank data. These data are described in the Data Appendix and presented in 
Appendix Table A2.  
 
                                                 
5
 For example, this appears to be the policy of Walmart with respect to trade unions. They vehemently 
oppose union organisation at home in the United States, but are prepared to countenance unionisation in 
counties where it is common in the retail sector. See 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/wal-mart-works-with-unions-abroad-but-not-at-
home/2011/06/07/AG0nOPLH_story.html 
6
 In the survey the term "General Manager" is used to identify the CEO, but throughout the paper we refer 
to this executive as the CEO.  
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We use multivariate models to account for the variation in the use of incentive contracts 
for CEOs across firms. Our chief interest is the role played by two local level policy 
experiments in influencing firm use of CEO incentive contracts. The first is privatisation, 
which we capture with the reduction in the percentage of all employment in a province 
accounted for by SOE employment between 1978 and 2005 (the share SOE in 1978 
minus the share SOE in 2005). In 1978 three-quarters (76%) of all provincial 
employment was accounted for by SOEs, a figure which had fallen by two-thirds to 29% 
in 2005.
7
 Whilst it is plausible, for reasons outlined earlier, that early privatisation may 
have led to CEO incentive contract adoption at local level, it is equally plausible that it 
was the early adoption of CEO incentive contracts by SOEs that accounts for variance in 
CEO incentive contracts across cities. If privatisation and the initial employment share in 
SOEs are positively correlated we may erroneously attribute the use of incentive 
contracts to privatization if using an indicator of the rate of change in SEO employment 
alone. We therefore also incorporate the fraction of SOE employment in provinces in 
1978. 
 
The second policy initiative is the start up year for SEZs which leads to an influx of FDI 
to the city. We observe the dates at which city-level SEZs are officially sanctioned at 
city, province and national level (see the Data Appendix for further details) and expect 
the use of incentive contracts to be higher in areas that have held SEZ-status for longer. 
We identify early SEZ start-ups as those receiving national government endorsements 
between 1980 and 1991: 18% of cities in the survey had received national endorsement of 
an SEZ, compared with 23% of cities with an SEZ with city endorsement and 22% with 
an SEZ with provincial endorsement.
 8
  
 
                                                 
7
 We tested the sensitivity of our results to a measure of privatisation over the period 1978 to 2004. Results 
were similar but weaker, probably because the privatisation programme was on-going between 2004 and 
2005. According to the Chinese Statistical Yearbook the mean city SOE employment share in our 120 cities 
stood at 41% in 2004. 
8
  We focus on national recognition of an SEZ because this indicates that the SEZ had successfully reached 
a national standard and was therefore able to exert autonomous power (permitting local authorisation of 
FDI contracts). As a sensitivity check we rerun all our analyses using Wang's (2013) data on start dates for 
SEZ's. We take the start date of the Enterprise Development Zone (EDZ) or Industrial Development Zone 
(IDZ), whichever is earliest, to denote the SEZ start date. The results we present in the next section are not 
sensitive to the use of Wang's data. 
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We also anticipate that the use of incentive contracts to reward CEOs will vary with firm 
characteristics (size, industry etc.), the firm's corporate governance arrangements, other 
policies used by the firm such as the threat of dismissal, and the characteristics of the 
CEO (see Bryson et al, 2012). These control variables are described in Appendix Table 
A1. 
 
There are perhaps two major problems in identifying any causal relationship between 
local level policy experimentation and firm use of CEO incentive contracts. The first 
problem is that firms' location decisions may be dependent, in part, on their expectations 
governing local environments, including whether they are subject to policy experiments 
such as SEZ's and privatisation. Thus firms may select into or out of cities partly in 
response to changing local policy environments, whereupon local variation in patterns of 
CEO incentive contracts may simply reflect those location decisions, rather than being 
driven by the sorts of technological diffusion mechanisms described earlier. We are 
unfortunately unable to address this issue, as we have no panel data on individual firms. 
The second is that the policy experiments are not randomly assigned to cities: rather, 
whether and when a city adopts a policy of privatisation and/or SEZ adoption may 
depend, in part, on local conditions in a city and perceptions as to whether the city would 
benefit from such an intervention. This is certainly the case with respect to early SEZ 
adoption since central government officials encouraging experimentation were cognizant 
of the need to identify locations which gave local experiments the best chance of success. 
Mindful of this particular difficulty we adopt two broad modelling strategies. Throughout 
we present linear estimates with standard errors clustered to account for city-level 
sampling. 
 
The first strategy is to run firm-level regressions that take the following form: 
 
1) 1 2 3 4 5 678      if c p p f i f ifINCEN β SEZ β PRIV β SOE β CG β CEO β X ε  
 
Where INCENif is a dummy identifying contracts linking pay to performance for CEO i in 
firm f; SEZc is the year the city's SEZ was introduced (or in most of our specifications a 
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dummy identifying early SEZ introduction); PRIVp is the change in the SOE employment 
share at provincial level between 1978 and 2005; SOE78P is the SOE employment share 
at provincial level in 1978; CGf is a vector of corporate governance variables in firm f; 
CEOi are individual CEO demographic and job attributes; Xf are structural firm attributes; 
epsilon is the error term and the betas are coefficients to be estimated.
9
 In practice, the 
absence of panel data means that we observe only one CEO per firm and so the i and f are 
non-separable.  
 
One possibility under this approach is that firms' ownership status in 2005 may be due, in 
part, to the policy experiments (privatisation and SEZ-induced FDI) whose effects we are 
trying to identify. If so, ownership in 2005 partials out some of the effects which might 
reasonably be attributed to the local reforms. We therefore run sensitivity checks which 
exclude firms' ownership status. 
 
The second modelling strategy is to condition on city-level means of all right-hand side 
variables in addition to the controls in equation 1. In constructing the city mean variables 
we exclude the firm observation in question from the computation of the mean. The 
equation takes the following form: 
 
2) 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
78    
    
if c p p f i
f c c c fi
INCEN β SEZ β PRIV β SOE β CG β CEO
β X β CG β CEO β X ε
 
 
In this model each firm-level covariate has a city-level analogue, as denoted by the 
subscript c.
10
  The value in conditioning on these city-level observable features of firms 
and their CEOs is that any association between our dependent variable - firm use of CEO 
incentive contracts - and the two policy variables (SEZ introduction and the rate of 
privatisation) is not confounded by other observable city features. Of course, because 
these city-level characteristics are measured at the end of the period (2005) they may 
                                                 
9
 See Appendix Table A1 for a full description of the variables appearing in each vector of controls. 
10
 Throughout we assume that the city (or province in the case of privatisation) is the level of spatial 
aggregation which is appropriate in capturing the effects of SEZ's and local decisions regarding SOE 
privatisation. In Gibbons and Overman's (2012) terminology firms within cities are allocated the same 
neighbourhood weight. 
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partial out some of the effects of the policy interventions that are due to CEO or firm 
selection. In addition the vector Xc includes city means for foreign ownership and state 
ownership of firms in 2005, both of which will be a function, at least in part, of the two 
policy interventions we are interested in. We therefore run sensitivity tests excluding 
mean ownership in 2005. 
 
Even with this plethora of city-level controls we can not discount the possibility that any 
remaining association between our policy variables and a firm's use of CEO incentive 
contracts is being driven by unobserved features of the city. In an effort to account for 
this, at least partially, we supplement the contemporaneous city-level means for firm, 
CEO and governance traits, with lagged city characteristics capturing otherwise 
unobserved city traits. These lagged variables capture city population, employment 
levels, industry structure, the number of firms in the city, industrial production, city GDP, 
and the incidence of labour disputes. These lagged city variables are not available for 4 
cities, resulting in a small reduction in estimation samples.  
 
Ideally we would want to account for the non-random timing of our policy interventions 
and firm sorting by location but data limitations mean we cannot account for firm-level 
unobservables nor time-varying factors at firm or city level which may bias our estimates.  
 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
To illustrate the city clustering of CEO incentive contracts in China Figure 1 presents the 
city coefficients from a city fixed-effects model estimating the likelihood that a firm uses 
an incentive contract to reward its CEO in 2005 relative to the reference city of Anqing in 
Anhui province. Darker shading represents larger positive coefficients. The city with 
firms least likely to deploy incentive contracts is Dongguan in Guangdong province 
which is 28.2% less likely to deploy incentive contracts than reference city Anqing in 
Anhui Province and followed by two cities in Hebei province (Zhangjiakou and 
Qinhuangdao). The city with firms most likely to use incentive contracts is Hangzhou in 
 14 
Zhejiang province which is 21.4% more likely to use incentive contracts than reference 
city Anqing. Together the city dummies account for around 5 percent of the variance in 
firms' propensity to use incentive contracts.  
 
[INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2] 
 
Figure 2 presents city coefficients again, but this time from a model as per the equation 
below which controls for firm and CEO characteristics as presented in Appendix Table 
A1: 
 
3) 1 2 3 4    if c f i f fiINCEN βCITY β CG β CEO β X ε  
 
The city fixed effects coefficients (the betas for each city) in equation 3 capture the fixed 
unobservable features of cities which affect the propensity of firms to adopt CEO 
incentive contracts, having accounted for the composition of firms and CEOs in the city.  
This model explains twice the variance in incentive contracts (10 percent as opposed to 5 
percent for the raw city dummies model). However, the ranking of cities' coefficients is 
similar - the correlation coefficient is 0.92 - suggesting that the city-level effects are not 
driven by the composition of the firms or executives in the city.
11
 In terms of firm-level 
ownership, we find that majority state ownership is associated with a higher probability 
of a CEO being paid under an incentive contract than those in other firms. More 
interestingly, foreign owned firms are significantly less likely to use incentive contracts 
for CEOs. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
Model (1) in Table 1 presents the raw correlations between firm use of CEO incentive 
contracts and the two local policy experiments, namely the early introduction of a city 
SEZ and the rate of privatisation in the province to which the city belongs. Models (2) to 
(5) run the same analysis but gradually condition on additional sets of variables, as 
                                                 
11
 Full versions of all the models discussed are available from the authors on request. 
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indicated in the bottom half of the table. Setting up an SEZ prior to 1992 is negatively 
associated with firm use of CEO incentive contracts in 2005, but the effect becomes 
statistically non-significant once city-level controls are introduced.
12
 There is therefore 
some evidence of a link between SEZ adoption and the subsequent use of CEO incentive 
contracts by firms in the vicinity, but any association is in fact driven by city-level traits 
that are unobserved in Models (1) to (3).  
 
In contrast, early privatisation, as indicated by the rate of decline in the proportion of 
provincial employment accounted for by SOEs, is strongly positively associated with 
firm use of CEO incentive contracts in all four models. The effect is large. The 
coefficient is 0.52 without controls and 0.51 with controls, and is very precisely 
estimated. This means that a 10 per cent increase (fall) in the share of employment in the 
non-state sector over the period translates into a 5 per cent increase (fall) in the 
probability that a firm in that city will use incentive contracts for its CEO. These effects 
do not change very much with the introduction of city-level contemporaneous and lagged 
controls. On the other hand, the share of provincial employment in SOEs in 1978 is not 
statistically significant.
13
 These results lend credence to the suggestion that privatisation 
encouraged the adoption of CEO incentive contracts. 
 
 
To investigate why the adoption of SEZs is not associated with greater use of incentive 
contracts to reward CEOs, as hypothesised earlier in the paper, we look further at the 
compensation practices of foreign-owned firms in China. One possibility is that foreign-
owned firms prefer to use efficiency wages to incentivise their CEOs, rather than 
incentive contracts, effectively out-bidding domestic rivals for the best executive talent 
by paying above market rates. Our data do not contain information on levels of 
compensation for CEO's so we are unable to test this proposition directly. However, we 
                                                 
12
 In the same way, if we replace the SEZ start date dummy with a continuous variable based on Wang's 
data identifying the date of SEZ start up the coefficient is positive and statistically significant until city-
level controls are added. 
13
 The association between the rate of privatisation between 1978 and 2005 and the SOE share of 
employment in 1978 is negative and weak, so the privatisation effect on incentive contracts is not simply 
proxying having a large SOE employment share at the start of the period. 
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do have information on average wages of permanent workers in firms and the proportion 
of their pay that is fixed, and the proportion that consists of bonuses. How firms 
compensate their permanent staff may give us some insights into their approach to 
executive compensation. We therefore ran models using the standard controls but 
replaced our dependent variable on the use of CEO incentive contracts with the average 
pay of permanent employees. We find that, conditioning on other factors, foreign firms 
pay significantly more than other firms. Furthermore, conditioning on foreign ownership 
and all other controls, the level of pay a firm sets for its permanent employees is 
positively and significantly associated with the mean percentage of foreign owned firms 
in the city. In a regression estimating average wages of permanent workers in 2004 yuan, 
the coefficient on mean share of foreign owned firms in the city (excluding the firm 
respondent)  was 793.34 (t-statistic=3.49). The share of foreign owned firms in the city is 
also associated with a higher percentage of permanent employees' compensation being 
made up of fixed salary rather than bonuses and other performance-based pay. In a 
regression estimating the percentage of permanent workers' compensation paid via a 
fixed salary, the coefficient on mean share of foreign owned firms in the city (excluding 
the firm respondent) was 10.80 (t-stat=3.27). This evidence, albeit for permanent workers 
rather than executives, suggests foreign owned firms exert a negative influence over 
firms' propensity to use incentive contracts, preferring instead to pay their workers in 
excess of the market wage in the locality. This makes sense if foreign firms are attracted 
by efficiency wages, for example, or if there are administrative or other impediments to 
adopting the incentive-type structures favoured by domestic firms. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
  
Although China is now the second largest economy in the world, all we know about 
executive compensation comes from studies of public listed companies and state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). This paper is the first to examine incentive contracts for CEOs across 
all industrial sectors of the economy. We do so using World Bank enterprise data for 
2005. We show that incentive contracts are commonplace but that their incidence varies 
significantly across Chinese cities. This is unsurprising given the role of sub-national 
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governments, including cities and provinces, in experimenting with market-oriented 
reforms. We test two hypotheses to explain the pattern of incentives across China's cities. 
The first considers the rate at which SOEs were privatised. The literature clearly indicates 
that SOEs were among the first firms in China to use incentive contracts for executives. 
Despite this, the correlation between CEO incentive contracts in 2005 and the share of 
provincial employment accounted for by SOEs in 1978 is, if anything, negative, not 
positive. However, we find CEO incentive contracts are positively correlated with the 
speed with which provinces privatised their SOEs. The finding is robust to controlling for 
a wide range of CEO and firm characteristics at both individual firm and city level. Many 
of these privatisations took the form of management buy-outs, so that some of the CEOs 
on incentive contracts were simply shifted to the private sector. However, it appears other 
domestically-owned firms followed the initiative taken by these first movers in much the 
same way as the technology diffusion literature might have predicted. 
 
We also considered a second major reform undertaken at regional and city level, namely 
the introduction of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). The literature clearly indicates that 
these SEZs were very successful at attracting FDI and so we expect that early 
introduction of an SEZ is also positively associated with the use of incentive contracts in 
a city, since incentive contracts are commonly used by Western firms to compensate their 
CEOs. Our empirical analysis reveals that firms' use of CEO incentive contracts is in fact 
uncorrelated with the early introduction SEZs, after conditioning on other characteristics 
of the firm and region. Using data on the compensation of permanent employees we find 
foreign ownership, both at firm and city level, is associated with higher levels of 
compensation and an increased likelihood of paying a fixed salary as opposed to 
incentive and bonus-based contracts. This is consistent with foreign-owned firms 
preferring to use efficiency wages to incentivise workers, paying them above the market-
rate, rather than via incentive contracts. Although we do not have the data on CEO 
compensation levels, it is quite possible that foreign ownership leads to higher-than-
average CEO compensation levels as a substitute for the use of bonus-based payments. 
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Table 1: Association Between CEO Incentive Contracts, SEZ Introduction and 
Privatisation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SEZ set up in city before 1992:  
 -.053 
(2.44)* 
-.061 
(3.30)** 
-.042 
(2.71)** 
-.020 
(1.12) 
-.035 
(1.69) 
Change in provincial employment in SOEs 1978-2005:  
 .524 
(4.44)** 
.503 
(4.47)** 
.513 
(4.73)** 
.446 
(3.32)** 
.432 
(3.57)** 
Provincial employment in SOEs in 1978:  
 -.077  
(0.08) 
-.151 
(1.58) 
-.186 
(2.08)* 
-.137 
(1.15) 
-.118 
(1.40) 
Constant:      
 .487 
(5.45)** 
.197 
(1.93) 
.184 
(1.86) 
.018 
(0.05) 
.395 
(1.57) 
CEO controls           
Firm controls           
Firm ownership           
City-level 
controls 
          
City-level lagged 
controls 
          
Observations 11817 11817 11817 11817 11133 
Adj. R-squared 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08 
Note: 
(1) Linear estimation of firm use of incentive contracts. 
(2) t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at city level. 120 city clusters in Models (1)-(4) and 116 
clusters in Model (5). * Statistically significant at 95% CI; ** statistically significant at 99% CI. 
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DATA APPENDIX  
 
We use data from the 2005 World Bank Investment Climate Survey undertaken by the National 
Bureau of Statistics in China (www.enterprisesurveys.org) which is described in Section Four. 
Descriptive information on these variables is presented in Appendix Table A1. In addition, 
descriptive information on privatisation and the introduction of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
and other city lagged variables such as population, employment, GDP, firm numbers, and 
industrial share of employment and GDP is also presented Appendix Table A1. We link 
information on privatisation and the introduction of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to the 
World Bank data by matching information from external sources to the city and province 
identifiers in the World Bank data. These data are presented in Appendix Table A2.  
Columns 3 and 4 of Table A2 contain the employment share of SOE's by province in 1978 and 
2005 respectively. Using data from the Chinese Statistical Yearbook for 1978-2008 we calculate 
the share as the number of employed persons in the state-owned sector divided by the total 
number of employed persons in urban units at year-end by status of registration.  
 
Columns 5-7 identify the year in which cities and provinces established Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs), also sometimes referred to as Development Zones. Column 5 identifies the year in which 
city level SEZ's were established; column 6 identifies the year in which provincial SEZ's were 
acknowledged; and the final column identifies the year that national SEZ's were acknowledged. 
Where the three dates are identical this indicates that the SEZ was an experiment initiated by the 
central state. Where the national SEZ date is later than or equal to the date for the provincial SEZ 
and the date for the city SEZ predates that for the provincial SEZ this indicates a local city-level 
experiment that subsequently gained national recognition. Where the date for a national SEZ is 
absent but there is evidence of a city or provincial SEZ this means the local SEZ initiative has 
yet to be sanctioned by the central state. Finally, there are two cities with no date for the 
establishment of a SEZ; this indicates there is no SEZ in that city in the period through to 2010. 
These dates are obtained from various web resources including the website for China 
Development Zones at http://www.cadz.org.cn/en/index.jsp?ItemID=1650. An English website 
of the listing of the development zones can be found at 
http://www.cadz.org.cn/en/etdz.jsp?ItemID=558. 
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We present descriptive statistics on (at the firm-level) on the prevalence of our policy 
experiments, and on other characteristics of the cities in which are surveyed firms are located, at 
the bottom of Table A1. 
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Appendix Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Whether CEO Pay Linked to Firm Performance 11817 0.669  0.470  0 1 
      
Corporate governance:      
Type of Board of Directors (BOD): No BOD 11817 0.279  0.449  0 1 
   BOD with CEO/Chair separation 11817 0.357  0.479  0 1 
   BOD with CEO/Chair duality 11817 0.364  0.481  0 1 
Fire or demotion of CEO, last 4 years 11817 0.222  0.416  0 1 
Ratio of CEO wage to middle managers' (categorical) 11817 2.166  1.240  1 5 
 
CEO characteristics: 
     
CEO tenure (years) 11817 6.399  4.721  1 56 
Education of CEO (categorical) 11817 5.575  0.994  1 7 
CEO appointed by government 11817 0.119  0.324  0 1 
Production autonomy of CEO 11817 7.410  1.490  1 8 
Investment autonomy of CEO 11817 6.868  2.054  1 8 
Employment autonomy of CEO (categorical) 11817 7.305  1.587  1 8 
 
Firm characteristics: 
     
Majority ownership: State 11817 0.131  0.337  0 1 
   Collective 11817 0.082  0.275  0 1 
   Legal persons 11817 0.259  0.438  0 1 
   Private 11817 0.367  0.482  0 1 
   Foreign 11817 0.130  0.337  0 1 
   No majority ownership 11817 0.031  0.174  0 1 
Size (Log of employees) 11817 5.619  1.473  1.8  13.5  
Age (Log of years) 11817 2.277  0.786  1.1  4.9  
Coefficient of variation in sales, last 3 years 11817 0.324  0.251  0 1.7  
Number of power outages annually 11817 11.397  23.903  0 400 
Average wage for permanent workers 2004-02 (yuan) 11817 1011.4 684.3 0.4 13247 
Average wage for permanent workers 2004 (yuan) 11817 1097.1 768.9 0.4 13653 
Average working hours per week (categorical) 11816 3.35 1.53 1 6 
% permanent worker compensation in fixed salary 11573 46.97 34.97 0 100 
% permanent worker compensation in bonus 11573 12.92 17.26 0 100 
Industry: Petroleum 11817 0.014  0.119  0 1 
   AgProcess 11817 0.079  0.269  0 1 
   BlackMetal 11817 0.040  0.196  0 1 
   ChemFiber 11817 0.004  0.063  0 1 
   ChemMat 11817 0.116  0.321  0 1 
   ClothShoeHat 11817 0.017  0.127  0 1 
   ColorMetal 11817 0.028  0.164  0 1 
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Appendix Table A1 continued 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   CommunicateEquip 11817 0.046  0.210  0 1 
   Craft   11817 0.009  0.093  0 1 
   DrinkManufacture 11817 0.014  0.117  0 1 
   EduSportGood 11817 0.003  0.057  0 1 
   Electronics 11817 0.069  0.254  0 1 
   FoodManufacture 11817 0.020  0.140  0 1 
   Furniture 11817 0.004  0.067  0 1 
   GeneralEquip 11817 0.087  0.282  0 1 
   Instruments 11817 0.005  0.069  0 1 
   Leather 11817 0.012  0.107  0 1 
   Medical Equip 11817 0.034  0.182  0 1 
   Metal   11817 0.030  0.170  0 1 
   NonMetal 11817 0.105  0.306  0 1 
   Paper   11817 0.019  0.137  0 1 
   Plastic 11817 0.027  0.163  0 1 
   Printing 11817 0.005  0.069  0 1 
   Recycle 11817 0.000  0.016  0 1 
   Rubber  11817 0.002  0.040  0 1 
   SpecificEquip 11817 0.040  0.196  0 1 
   Textile 11817 0.077  0.267  0 1 
   Tobacco 11817 0.003  0.059  0 1 
   TransEquip 11817 0.079  0.270  0 1 
   WoodProcessing 11817 0.011  0.105  0 1 
Main City and Provincial Characteristics: 
Means for other firms in city: 
  CEO incentive contracts 
  Foreign owned 
  State-owned 
 
 
11817 
11817 
11817 
 
 
0.668 
0.128 
0.129 
 
 
0.106 
0.166  
0.090 
 
 
0.40 
0  
0 
 
 
0.90 
0.81  
0.36 
Start date for city SEZ  before 1992 11817 0.225 0.419 0 1 
Change in SOE share of provincial employment, 78-05 11817 0.478 0.068 0.29 0.60 
SOE share of provincial employment in 1978 11817 0.764 0.080 0.58 0.90 
SOE share of provincial employment in 2005 11817 0.285 0.112 0.13 0.56 
Change in SOE share of provincial employment, 78-05 11817 0.478 0.068 0.29 0.60 
Number of city population in 1990 (10,000 people) 11430 417.8 354.3 16.4 2251 
Number of city population in 1994 (10,000 people) 11620 450.3 310.4 27.5 1512 
GDP of the city in 1990 (100 million RMB) 11620 95.52 113.7 2.68 756.4 
GDP of the city in 1994 (100 million RMB) 11623 271.8 283.8 7.65 1971 
Number of city industrial firms with annual sales larger 
than 5 million in 1994  
11620 2730 2666 103 14375 
Value-added of city industrial firms with annual sales 
larger than 5 million in 1994 (100 million RMB) 
11620 367.4 507.3 8.45 3760 
Number of city employment in 1994 (10,000 people) 11620 253.0 174.5 13.7 849.7 
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Number of provincial labourers involved in industrial 
disputes per 10,000 urban employment in 1995 
11617 27.74 11.97 7.89 97.6 
Share of city employment in first industry in 1994 11620 40.9 16.15 1.1 70.8 
Share of city employment in second industry in 1994 11620 31.9 11.01 12.6 68.9 
Share of city employment in first industry in 2005 11720 2.65 3.37 0.08 19.4 
Share of city employment in second industry in 2005 11817 45.9 11.6 24.4 77.6 
Share of city GDP in first industry in 1990 11623 23.0 13.6 2.48 56.4 
Share of city GDP in second industry in 1990 11623 48.9 12.3 21.0 91.0 
Share of city GDP in first industry in 1994 11620 18.0 10.5 1.39 43.9 
Share of city GDP in second industry in 1994 11620 48.9 9.28 29.8 85.4 
Share of city GDP in first industry in 2005 11817 12.6 8.49 0.20 34.5 
Share of city GDP in second industry in 2005 11817 48.3 9.19 27.0 85.9 
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Appendix Table A2: City and Provincial Indexes of Marketisation  
 
Province City Employment 
Share of SOE, 
1978 
Employment 
Share of 
SOE, 2005 
SEZ, 
city 
SEZ, 
province 
SEZ, 
national 
Anhui Anqing 0.74 0.27 1992 1993 2010 
Anhui Chuzhou 0.74 0.27 1992 1992 2010 
Anhui Hefei 0.74 0.27 1993 1993 2000 
Anhui Wuhu 0.74 0.27 1993 1993 1993 
Beijing Beijing 0.83 0.26 1994 1994 1994 
Chongqing Chongqing 0.69 0.19 1993 1993 1993 
Fujian Fuzhou 0.72 0.26 1986 1986 1986 
Fujian Quanzhou 0.72 0.26 1996 1996 2010 
Fujian Sanming 0.72 0.26 2009 2010  
Fujian Xiamen 0.72 0.26 1981 1981 1981 
Fujian Zhangzhou 0.72 0.26 1992 1992 2010 
Gansu Lanzhou 0.90 0.42 1993 1993 2002 
Gansu Tianshui 0.90 0.42 1994 1994 2009 
Guangdong Dongguan 0.71 0.20 2003 2006  
Guangdong Foshan 0.71 0.20 2003 2006  
Guangdong Guangzhou 0.71 0.20 1984 1984 1984 
Guangdong Huizhou 0.71 0.20 1993 1993 1993 
Guangdong Jiangmen 0.71 0.20 1991 1991  
Guangdong Maoming 0.71 0.20 1992 1992  
Guangdong Shantou 0.71 0.20 1981 1981 1981 
Guangdong Shenzhen 0.71 0.20 1980 1980 1980 
Guangdong Zhuhai 0.71 0.20 1980 1980 1980 
Guangxi Guilin 0.84 0.24 1992 1994  
Guangxi Liuzhou 0.84 0.24 1992 1992  
Guangxi Nanning 0.84 0.24 1992 1992 2001 
Guizhou Guiyang 0.80 0.32 1993 1993 2000 
Guizhou Zunyi 0.80 0.32 1992 1992 2010 
Hainan Haikou 0.90 0.46 1988 1988 1988 
Hebei Baoding 0.83 0.45 2000 2006  
Hebei Cangzhou 0.83 0.45 2003 2003 2010 
Hebei Handan 0.83 0.45 1992 1992  
Hebei Langfang 0.83 0.45 1992 1992 2009 
Hebei Qinhuangdao 0.83 0.45 1984 1984 1984 
Hebei Shijiazhuang 0.83 0.45 1992 1992  
Hebei Tangshan 0.83 0.45 1992 1992 2010 
Hebei Zhangjiakou 0.83 0.45 1992 2006  
Heilongjiang Daqing 0.79 0.36 2006 2006  
Heilongjiang Harbin 0.79 0.36 1993 1993 1993 
Heilongjiang Qiqihar 0.79 0.36    
Henan Luoyang 0.82 0.43 1992 1994  
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Henan Nanyang 0.82 0.43    
Henan Shangqiu 0.82 0.43 1995 1995  
Henan Xinxiang 0.82 0.43 1992 1994  
Henan Xuchang 0.82 0.43 1994 1994 2000 
Henan Zhengzhou 0.82 0.43 1993 1993 2000 
Henan Zhoukou 0.82 0.43 1997 1997  
Hubei Huanggang 0.81 0.24 1992 1992 2010 
Hubei Jingmen 0.81 0.24 2000 2000  
Hubei Jingzhou 0.81 0.24 1992 1992 2011 
Hubei Wuhan 0.77 0.29 1991 1991 1993 
Hubei Xiangfan 0.81 0.24 1992 1992 1992 
Hubei Xiaogan 0.81 0.24 1997 1997  
Hubei Yichang 0.81 0.24 1988 1992 2010 
Hunan Changde 0.77 0.29 1992 1994  
Hunan Changsha 0.77 0.29 1992 1992 2000 
Hunan Hengyang 0.77 0.29 1992 1994  
Hunan Yueyang 0.77 0.29 1992 1992 2000 
Hunan Zhuzhou 0.77 0.29 1992 1992 1992 
Jiangsu Changzhou 0.63 0.13 1992 1992 1992 
Jiangsu Lianyungang 0.63 0.13 1984 1984 1984 
Jiangsu Nanjing 0.63 0.13 1988 1988 1991 
Jiangsu Nantong 0.63 0.13 1984 1984 1984 
Jiangsu Suzhou 0.63 0.13 1992 1992 1992 
Jiangsu Wuxi 0.63 0.13 1992 1992 1992 
Jiangsu Xuzhou 0.63 0.13 1992 1992  
Jiangsu Yancheng 0.63 0.13 1992 1993 2010 
Jiangsu Yangzhou 0.63 0.13 1992 1992 2009 
Jiangxi Ganzhou 0.82 0.30 2004 2004 2010 
Jiangxi Jiujiang 0.82 0.30 1992 1992 2010 
Jiangxi Nanchang 0.82 0.30 1991 1991 1991 
Jiangxi Shangrao 0.82 0.30 2001 2001 2010 
Jiangxi Yichun 0.82 0.30 2003 2006  
Jilin Changchun 0.77 0.32 1993 1993 1993 
Jilin Jilin 0.77 0.32 1992 1992 1992 
Liaoning Anshan 0.76 0.29 1991 1991 1992 
Liaoning Benxi 0.76 0.29 1993 1993  
Liaoning Dalian 0.76 0.29 1984 1984 1984 
Liaoning Fushun 0.76 0.29 1992 1993  
Liaoning Jinzhou 0.76 0.29 1992 1992 2010 
Liaoning Shenyang 0.76 0.29 1993 1993 1993 
Nei Mongol Baotou 0.80 0.46 1992 1992 1992 
Nei Mongol Hohhot 0.80 0.46 1992 1995 2000 
Ningxia Hui Wuzhong 0.88 0.43 2006 2006  
Ningxia Hui Yinchuan 0.88 0.43 1992 1992 2001 
Qinghai Xining 0.89 0.31 2000 2000 2000 
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Shaanxi Baoji 0.86 0.45 1992 1992 1992 
Shaanxi Xi'an 0.86 0.45 1993 1993 2000 
Shaanxi Xianyang 0.86 0.45 1992 1992  
Shandong Binzhou 0.75 0.18 2010 2010  
Shandong Jinan 0.75 0.18 1988 1990 1991 
Shandong Jining 0.75 0.18 1992 1992 2010 
Shandong Linyi 0.75 0.18 2003 2003 2010 
Shandong Qingdao 0.75 0.18 1984 1984 1984 
Shandong Tai'an 0.75 0.18 2000 2000  
Shandong Weifang 0.75 0.18 1992 1992 1992 
Shandong Weihai 0.75 0.18 1991 1991 1991 
Shandong Yantai 0.75 0.18 1984 1984 1984 
Shandong Zibo 0.75 0.18 1992 1992 1992 
Shanghai Shanghai 0.79 0.20 1986 1986 1986 
Shanxi Datong 0.85 0.56 1992 1992 2010 
Shanxi Taiyuan 0.85 0.56 1991 1991 1992 
Shanxi Yuncheng 0.85 0.56 1992 1992  
Sichuan Chengdu 0.75 0.23 1991 1991 1991 
Sichuan Deyang 0.75 0.23 1992 1992 2010 
Sichuan Leshan 0.75 0.23 1992 2002  
Sichuan Mianyang 0.75 0.23 1992 1992 1992 
Sichuan Yibin 0.75 0.23 1992 1992  
Tianjin Tianjin 0.77 0.28 1984 1984 1984 
Xinjiang 
Uygur 
Wulumuqi 0.77 0.28 1994 1994 1994 
Yunnan Kunming 0.88 0.41 1992 1992 1992 
Yunnan Qujing 0.88 0.41 1992 1992 2010 
Yunnan Yuxi 0.88 0.41 1998 1998  
Zhejiang Hangzhou 0.58 0.13 1990 1991 1991 
Zhejiang Huzhou 0.58 0.13 1992 1992 2010 
Zhejiang Jiaxing 0.58 0.13 1992 1992 2010 
Zhejiang Jinhua 0.58 0.13 1992 1993 2010 
Zhejiang Ningbo 0.58 0.13 1984 1984 1984 
Zhejiang Shaoxing 0.58 0.13 2000 2000 2010 
Zhejiang Taizhou 0.58 0.13 1997 1997  
Zhejiang Wenzhou 0.58 0.13 1992 1992 1992 
 
 
 
 
 30 
Figure 1: City Effects on CEO Incentive Contracts, No Controls 
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Figure 2: City Effects on CEO Incentive Contracts, With Controls 
 
 
 
 
